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CITY NATIONAL BANK v. AMERICAN
COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL CORP:
THE APPLICATION OF RULE 10b-13 OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 TO
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 19331 ('33 Act) and Securities
Exchange Act of 19342 ('34 Act) to provide investors with the information
necessary to make informed investment decisions.3 Congress intended that
the '33 and '34 Acts protect investors from fraudulent and deceptive
practices in securities transactions by requiring the effective disclosure of
material facts pertaining to the sale of securities. 4 More specifically, the '33
1. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 74 § (1933)(codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1986)).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)(codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1986))
3. See 1 L. Loss, SECURIES REGULATIONS 21 (2d ed. 1961)(Congress expressed recurrent
theme of disclosure throughout Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
In enacting the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act), Congress attempted to control securities
investments in interstate commerce by requiring all issuers of new securities to disclose fully
all material information pertaining to the securities issue. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 89 (1933), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SEcuRiTIEs LAws LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982,
at 138, 138-39 (disclosure requirements of '33 Act provide investors with adequate information
necessary to judge accurately value of securities in initial offering). Congress thus attempted
to eliminate the concealment from the investing public of material facts concerning the securities
issue. Id. While the '33 Act regulates new issues of securities, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ('34 Act) regulates publicly traded corporations by requiring the continuous disclosure of
material information to the investing public. See infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text
(discussing scope of regulation of '33 and '34 Acts). In enacting the '34 Act, Congress sought
to control problems of secrecy concerning the financial condition of publicly traded corpora-
tions. See H.R. REp. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL
SEcutrrms LAWS LEGisLATrvE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 794, 804 (continuous disclosure of
information that the '34 Act requires provides investors with basis for valuing securities that
investors buy and sell); see also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934) [hereinafter
1934 SENATE REPORT], reprinted in I FEDERAL SEcuRrnES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-
1982, at 708, 717 ('34 Act requires corporations that have securities traded on national exchange
to file up-to-date information with Securities Exchange Commission).
4. See 1934 SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 (Congress specifically prohibited any
device that serves no legitimate purpose and that raises or depresses security prices artificially);
see also United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975)(discussing purpose
of Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934). In United Housing Foundation,
the United States Supreme Court explained that the primary purpose of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to prevent abuses in the securities market.
United Housing Foundation, 421 U.S. at 849. The Supreme Court explained that in the '33
and '34 Acts Congress focused on the sale of securities to raise capital, on the functioning of
the securities exchanges, and on the need to protect investors from fraud. Id.; see 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(defining security under '33 Act). Under the '33 Act, the term
"security" includes any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
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Act regulates the registration, offer, and sale of new issues of securities.'
Additionally, the '34 Act regulates securities exchanges, companies that have
securities traded on national securities exchanges, and the activities of
securities brokers, dealers, and underwriters. 6 Prior to 1968, the '33 and
and any interest or instrument commonly known as a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)(defining security under the '33 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982 & Supp. III
1985)(defining security under '34 Act). Under the '34 Act, the term "security" includes any
note, stock treasury stock, bond, debenture, or any interest commonly known as a security.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(defining security under the '34 Act); see H.R.
REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1933)[hereinafter 1933 HousE REPORT]. Congress defined
"security" in broad terms to include many types of instruments that fall within the ordinary
concept of a security in the commercial world. 1933 HousE REPORT, supra, at 11; see Vincent
v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 436 (10th Cir. 1973)(Congress intended definition of security under
'34 Act to be broad and to embrace wide variety of investment instruments). In Vincent v.
Moench, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit defined a security, generally,
as any transaction or scheme in which a person invests money in an enterprise to earn profits
from the enterprise's business activities. Vincent, 473 F.2d at 434; see Oxford Fin. Co. v.
Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431, 435 (D. Pa. 1974)(definitions of security under '33 and '34 Acts
are virtually identical and, therefore, test of security under '33 and '34 Acts is same); TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)(defining material fact). In TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, the United States Supreme Court explained that an omitted fact
is material when, under all the circumstances, a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable
shareholder would have considered the omitted fact important in the shareholder's investment
decision. TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449.
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(c)-(e), 77(e)(b)(23), 77(k), 770)(2)(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Sections 77(c)-(e) of the United States Code (Code) provide for the registration of securities
and exemptions from registration of securities. Id. §§ 77(c)-(e). Section 77(e)(b)(23) of the
Code requires the issuer of registered securities to give purchasers of the securities a prospectus
that contains the essential information found in the registration statement. Id. § 77(e)(b)(23).
Sections 77(k) and 77(1) of the Code impose civil liability on individuals for material misre-
presentations or omissions in the course of transactions resulting in the acquisition or sale of
a security. Id. §§ 77(k), 77(1).
6. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(f), 78(1), 780) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 78(f) of the
United States Code requires that before the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) can register
an exchange as a national security exchange, the SEC must determine whether the exchange
can prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, promote just and equitable
principles of trade, protect investors and the public interest, and provide fair procedures for
the disciplining of exchange members for violation of securities laws. Id. §78(f). Section 78(1)
prohibits members, brokers, or dealers from effecting transactions in any security on a national
security exchange unless the security is properly registered. Id. § 78(1). Section 780) prohibits
a person from employing any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange. Id. §
780); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (1986)(requiring disclosure of information in annual reports).
Corporations registered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must file an annual
report on Form 10-K. Id. Form 10-K annual reports include information concerning the nature
of the business, financial data, capital structure, and management structure. 11A pt.1 E.
GADsaY, Busnwnss ORGsA ONS § 4.021l] (1986)(discussing information required in Form
10-K); 17 C.F.R. § 249.13a-11 (1986)(requiring disclosure of current information). Issuers that
have securities registered under § 12 of the '34 Act must file a current report on Form 8-K.
Id. Form 8-K current reports include information concerning changes in control, acquisition
or disposition of assets, bankruptcy, and change in certified public accountants. See G.
GADsBY, supra, § 4.02[4l(discussing information required in Form 8-K).
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'34 Acts also required the disclosure of pertinent information that related
to exchange offers of stock and proxy solicitations. 7 The '33 and '34 Acts,
however, did not require the disclosure of material information in tender
offers.' In 1968 Congress amended the '34 Act by adopting the Williams
Act to require the disclosure of material information in the context of a
tender offer. 9 Specifically, section 14(e) of the Williams Act prohibits false
7. An exchange offer includes a tender offer for any security in exchange for consid-
eration that is not entirely cash. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13(b) (1986)(defining exchange offer);
Wellborn, Rule lOb-13: A Reconsideration, 26 Sw. L.J. 653, 653 n.2 (1972)(exchange offer
describes tender offers for any security in exchange for any consideration other than solely
for cash); Lowenfels, Rule l0b-13, Rule l0b-6 and Purchases of Target Company Securities
During an Exchange Offer, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 1392, 1392 (1969)(exchange offer is offer by
corporation of corporation's securities for securities of another corporation); see also infra
note 8 and accompanying text (distinguishing exchange offer from tender offer).
A proxy is an agency relationship that arises when a shareholder permits a proxy holder
to vote for the shareholder at a corporate shareholders' meeting. See Note, Proxy Solicitation:
The Need for Expanded Disclosure Requirements, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 1100, 1101 (1977)(defining
proxy). A proxy solicitation is a request for a proxy, a request to execute or not to execute a
proxy, or the furnishing of a proxy or other communication to security holders calculated to
result in the procurement, withholding, or revocation of a proxy. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
1(0(1) (1986)(defining proxy solicitation).
8. See 113 CONG. REc. 855 (1967)('33 and '34 Acts regulated only exchange offers
and proxy contests prior to 1968). In debating about the lack of regulation concerning tender
offers, Senator Williams explained that a gap existed in securities regulation because a tender
offeror was not required to disclose any information, while persons involved in exchange
offers or proxy contests had to disclose the information necessary for investors to make
intelligent investment decisions. Id. Senator Williams further noted that the absence of any
requirement for a tender offeror to disclose material information was inconsistent with the
prevailing disclosure patterns in the securities markets. Id.
A tender offer is a public invitation to shareholders to sell all or part of their shares at
a premium over the current price. Korval, Defining Tender Offers: Resolving a Decade of
Dilemma, 13 SEC. L. Rv. 549, 549 (1981); see Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-
24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979Xdiscussing characteristics of tender offer). In Wellman v. Dickinson, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York noted that tender offerors
usually engage in active solicitation of public shareholders of an issuer. Wellman, 475 F.2d at
823. The district court further noted that tender offerors also solicit a substantial percentage
of the issuer's stock, offer to purchase the stock at a premium over the market price, and
offer a firm rather than a negotiable price. Id. at 823-24. Finally, the district court noted that
tender offerors make the offer contingent on a minimum number of shares, make the offer
outstanding for a limited amount of time, and subject the offeree to pressure to tender the
stock. Id. Neither the Securities Exchange Commission nor Congress, however, has defined a
tender offer. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir.)(noting that
Congress and SEC have declined to define term "tender offer"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1979).
9. Pub. L. No. 439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Congress enacted the Williams Act in response to the
significant increase in cash tender offers during the 1960's. See H.R. RaP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (increase in cash tender offers necessitated regulation of cash tender offers)
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AnsmN. NEws 2811, 2812-13. Congress' goal in enacting the
Williams Act was to ensure that tender offerors would provide target company shareholders
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or misleading statements of material fact, omissions of material fact, and
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts that arise in connection with
tender offers.' 0
In addition to adopting section 14(e) of the Williams Act to combat
abuses involved in connection with tender offers, Congress enacted section
10(b) of the '34 Act, which grants the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) rule making powers to prevent abuses in the securities field that
Congress specifically did not prohibit." In 1969, pursuant to sections 10(b),
with the information necessary to permit the shareholders to make rational decisions concerning
the tender offer. Id. The Williams Act requires tender offerors to include in proxies detailed
information about the financial condition of persons making the tender offer and about the
background of directors and executive officers. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (discussing material
information that tender offeror must disclose in tender offer). The '34 Act also requires a
proxy to include information concerning transactions between directors and officers and others
that may give rise to a conflict of interest. Id. Additionally, the Williams Act requires a proxy
to include information about matters in which shareholders must vote. Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 14(e) of the Williams Act
prohibits a person from using untrue statements of material fact, from omitting statements of
material fact, or from engaging in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in
connection with a tender offer, request or invitation to tender, or any solicitation of security
holders in opposition to or in favor of any tender offer. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. 14a-l(f)
(1986)(defining solicitation). The term solicitation includes any request for a proxy, any request
to execute, not to execute, or revoke a proxy, and any communication to security holders that
a solicitor reasonably calculates will result in the procurement, withholding, or revocation of
a proxy. 17 C.F.R. § 240a-l(f) (1986); see also Calumet Industries, Inc. v. MacClure, 464
F.Supp. 19, 32 (N.D. Ill., E.D. 1978)(court cannot broaden definition of solicitation beyond
definition in regulations); Goolrick, Purchases on the Market of Target Company Stock, 26
Bus. LAw. 457, 472-73 (1970)(discussing § 14e of Williams Act as general anti-fraud and anti-
manipulation provisions that apply to pre-tender purchases).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(prohibiting manipulative and
deceptive devices in connection with purchase or sale of securities). Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) prohibits any person from using any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, the mails, or any facility of a national security exchange
to manipulate any rules and regulations that the Securities Exchange Commission proscribes
for the protection of investors in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Id.;
see also 1934 SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 18 (Congress gave SEC broad rule-making
power to prevent mischievous practices). The drafters of § 10(b) of the '34 Act intended that
§ 10(b) enable the SEC to combat new manipulative and fraudulent practices. Hearings on
H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), reprinted in 8 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEaIsLATrvE
HISTORY OF THE SEcuxrras ACT OF 1933 AND SEctRITs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 23
(1973). The legislative history of § 10(b) does not demonstrate, however, the scope of the
SEC's authority to promulgate rules and regulations under § 10(b). Id.
An example of the SEC's authority to promulgate rules to prevent manipulative and
fraudulent practices is the SEC's promulgation of Rule lOb-5 of the '34 Act. 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1986). Rule lob-5 prohibits a person from employing any misrepresentative devices,
schemes, or other acts that operate as fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986); see Securities Exchange Commission v. M.A.
Lundy Assoc., 362 F.Supp. 326, 334 (R.I. 1973)(Rule lOb-5 protects investing public from
misleading statements or omissions in connection with purchase or sale of securities); see also
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13(e), 14(e), and 23(a) of the '34 Act, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-13.12
Rule lOb-13 prohibits any person who makes a tender or exchange offer
from purchasing or arranging to purchase outside the offer either the
securities of the target company or other securities that the person imme-
diately may convert into or exchange for the securities of the target company
while the offer is in effect. 3 Rule 10b-13 does not apply to purchases of a
target company's securities that are not within the tender or exchange offer
period.' 4 Until recently, no courts had considered, however, whether a
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORAIONs 825 (1983)(discussing requirements of
Rule lOb-5). Federal courts have allowed individuals an implied right of action against
individuals under Rule lOb-5. H. HENN, supra, at 825. To establish liability in fraudulent
corporate transactions under Rule lob-5, the plaintiff must offer proof of scienter in connection
with the sale or purchase of a security. H. HENN, supra, at 828-29. Additionally, plaintiffs
must be sellers or purchasers of a security to recover damages in a Rule lOb-5 transaction.
Id. at 829. To recover damages in situations in which an individual makes an affirmative
misrepresentation concerning the sale or purchase of a security, a plaintiff must establish that
the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation. Id at 826-27. To recover damages when an
individual does not disclose information, however, the plaintiff only must demonstrate the
information was material, not that the plaintiff relied on the information. Id. Under Rule
l0b-5, information is material when the information, if disclosed, would influence a reasonable
person to act differently. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.
1965)(discussing materiality requirement under Rule lOb-5); see also Goolrick, , supra note 10,
at 472-73 (discussing Rule lob-5 of '34 Act as general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation
provisions that apply to pre-tender purchases).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1986); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(e), 78n(e), 78w(a) (1982
& Supp. III 1985). Section 78j(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the SEC
to promulgate rules and regulations that modify the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985). Section 78m(e) of the '34 Act authorizes the SEC to define acts that are fraudulent,
manipulative, or deceptive and to proscribe means to prohibit such acts. Id. § 78m(e). Section
78n(e) of the '34 Act authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations that are necessary
to prevent fraud, manipulation, and deception in a tender offer. Id. § 78n(e). Section 78w(a)
of the '34 Act authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations necessary and appropriate
to implement the rules that the SEC must enforce. Id. § 78w(a).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13(a) (1986); see Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial
Intervention, 69 VA. L. REv. 563, 621 n.235 (1983)(discussing various statutory definitions of
target company). State corporation statutes, rather than federal securities laws, provide a
definition of target company. See e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110, § I (West 198 1)(defining
target company as company incorporated or having principal place of business in state and
company's securities are subject to takeover bid); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 73 (Purdon
1983)(same); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-13 (1986)(defining target company as company incorporated
in state and company's securities are involved in takeover effort).
14. Exchange Act Release No. 8712 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP.
(CCH) § 77,745 at 83,708 (Oct. 8, 1969). Purchases of securities made prior to a tender offer
period (pre-tender purchases), although not subject to Rule 10b-13 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ('34 Act), are subject to the general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions
that could apply to pre-tender purchases. Id.; see Sunshine Mining Co. v. Great W. United
Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 96,049 at 91,715 (D. Idaho
1977)(holding that Rule lOb-13 does not apply to pre-tender private purchases); see also supra
notes 10-11 (discussing examples general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions that apply
to pre-tender purchases of a target company's stock).
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tender offeror's status as a party to a contract to purchase stock in the
future that was executory at the commencement of a tender offer immunized
the tender offeror from the application of Rule lOb-13 to purchases pursuant
to the executory contract.' 5 In City National Bank v. American Common-
wealth Financial Corp. ,16 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered whether Rule lOb-13, which regulates securities purchases
during a tender offer period, regulates a pre-tender agreement that binds a
tender offeror to purchase the target company's securities when the parties
to the pre-tender purchase agreement did not execute fully the agreement
before the commencement of the tender offer period.1
7
In City National Bank, the plaintiffs were minority shareholders of All
American Assurance Company (All American)." In January, 1979, the
defendant, American Commonwealth Financial Corporation (American
Commonwealth) acquired 67% of All American's stock from American
Bank and Trust Company.' 9 American Commonwealth subsequently trans-
ferred its interest in All American's stock to a wholly-owned subsidiary of
American Commonwealth, Great Commonwealth Life Insurance Company
(Great Commonwealth).20 At the time of American Commonwealth's ac-
quisition of All American's shares and the subsequent transfer of the shares
to Great Commonwealth, Robert Shaw was the president of American
Commonwealth and a director of Great Commonwealth. 2' Additionally,
after Great Commonwealth acquired All American's shares from American
Commonwealth, Robert Shaw became president of All American. 22
On December 11, 1979, Great Commonwealth agreed to purchase 57,782
shares of All American's stock at $5 per share. 23 The terms of the stock
purchase agreement required Great Commonwealth to pay five percent of
15. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing Rule lOb-13); infra notes
52-62 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding in City National -Bank
concerning application of Rule 10b-13 to pre-tender stock purchase agreements of target
company's stock that parties to agreement fail to execute by commencement of tender offer
period).
16. 801 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1986).
17. See City Nat'l Bank v. American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 801 F.2d 714, 716-18
(4th Cir. 1986)(considering whether Rule 10b-13 applies to contracts to purchase stock that
are executory at commencement of tender offer).
18. Id. at 715.
19. Id. at 716. In City National Bank, American Commonwealth Financial Corporation
(American Commonwealth) acquired All American Assurance Company's (All American) stock
for $10.28 per share. Id. at 718.
20. Id at 716.
21. Id.
22. Id. In City National Bank, as a result of Great Commonwealth Life Insurance
Company's (Great Commonwealth) acquisition of American Commonwealth Financial Cor-
poration's interest in All American Assurance Company's stock, Robert Shaw simultaneously
held the positions of president of American Commonwealth and All American, and director




the purchase price on December 12, 1979 and the balance due on the
purchase price on January 2, 1980.24 The stock purchase agreement included
18,500 shares of the Post family trust's interest in All American's shares. 
2
On December 14, 1979, Great Commonwealth made a tender offer for
175,000 shares of All American's stock at $5 per share. 26 Great Common-
wealth's tender offer expired January 4, 1980.27 The tender offer enabled
Great Commonwealth to increase its interest in All American's stock to
80% of All American's outstanding shares. 28 The tender offer disclosed
fully Great Commonwealth's private purchases of the Post family's interest
in All American's stock. 29 Pursuant to the tender offer, the plaintiffs sold
their minority interest in All American to Great Commonwealth at the
tender offer price.30
In August, 1982, the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina.3 ' The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant violated Rule 10b-13 of the '34 Act because the defendant
did not make the initial five percent payment on the stock purchase
agreement due on December 12, 1979 until December 17, 1979, which was
during the tender offer period. 32 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant violated Rule lOb-5 of the '34 Act because the defendant made
material misrepresentations and omissions in the tender offer concerning
the defendant's purchase of the Post family's interest in All American's
stock.3 3 The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant committed common
law fraud and breached the defendant's fiduciary duties to the minority
24. Id.
25. Id. In City National Bank, the 18,500 shares of All American Assurance Company's
stock that the Post family trust owned were the only shares of the purchase agreement in
dispute. Id. The Post family had a substantial interest in the stock of I.C.H. Corporation
(I.C.H.). Id. at 717. I.C.H. owned Ozark National Life Insurance, which in turn had substantial
holdings in American Commonwealth Financial Corporation. Id.; see supra notes 20 & 23 and
accompanying text (American Commonwealth was parent corporation of Great Commonwealth
Life Insurance Company, which was party to purchase agreement for All American's stock).
26. City National Bank, 801 F.2d at 716; see supra note 10 and accompanying text
(defining tender offer as public invitation to shareholders to sell all or part of their shares at
premium over current market price).
27. City National Bank, 801 F.2d at 716.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. In November, 1982, after the plaintiffs in City National Bank sold their minority
interest in All American Assurance Company to Great Commonwealth Life Insurance Com-
pany, All American merged with I.C.H. Corporation. Id.
31. City Nat'l Bank v. American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 941, 942
(W.D.N.C. 1985).
32. City Nat'l Bank v. American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 801 F.2d 714, 716 (4th
Cir. 1986).
33. Id.; see supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing Rule lob-5 of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
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shareholders of All American. 34 The defendant argued that the evidence did
not support the plaintiffs' claims.31 More specifically, the defendant in City
National Bank claimed that the defendant did not violate Rule lOb-13
because the evidence established that the defendant completed the purchase
of the Post family's interest in All American's shares by receiving the stock
certificates to All American prior to the commencement of the tender
offer. 36 The defendant alternatively claimed that even if the defendant did
not complete the purchase of the Post family's interest in All American's
stock before the commencement of the tender offer, the defendant did not
violate Rule lOb-13 because the defendant became the beneficial owner of
34. City National Bank, 801 F.2d at 716; see Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138,
209 S.E.2d 494, 500-01 (1974)(discussing common law fraud in securities context). In Ragsdale
v. Kennedy, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the essential elements of fraud
are false representations or concealment of material facts that a person reasonably calculates
and intends will deceive another person. Ragsdale, 209 S.E.2d at 500. Additionally, the party
committing the fraud actually must deceive and damage the injured party. Id. The Ragsdale
court explained that the definition of fraud is sufficiently flexible to prevent persons that
essentially commit a fraudulent act from escaping liability based on a mere technical avoidance
the definition. Id.; see King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 216 Ga. 581, 585, 118 S.E.2d 581, 584-85
(1961)(discussing fiduciary duties at common law of directors and officers to disclose fully to
shareholders all material facts relative to value of corporation upon purchase by director of
shareholder's interest in corporation); Fulton v. Talbert, 255 N.C. 183, 185, 120 S.E.2d 410,
411-12 (1961)(discussing common law duties of directors and officers as fiduciaries). See
generally H. HENN, supra note 11, at 525-28 (discussing fiduciary duties of directors and
officers). Directors and officers are agents of a corporation and, therefore, are subject to the
fiduciary rules of agency. Fulton, 120 S.E.2d at 411; see King Mfg., 118 S.E.2d at 584
(directors and officers are fiduciaries). Directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to a
corporation and to the shareholders of the corporation. Fulton, 120 S.E.2d at 411; see King
Mfg., 118 S.E.2d at 584 (directors and officers owe fiduciary duty to corporation and
shareholders). As fiduciaries, directors and officers should discharge their duties in good faith
and with the diligence and care that prudent persons would exercise under similar circumstances
in like positions. Fulton, 120 S.E.2d at 411. Some states statutorily provide that directors and
officers owe fiduciary duties to a corporation and to the shareholders of the corporation. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1986)(providing that directors and officers owe fiduciary duty to
corporation and shareholders to discharge duties in good faith and with diligence and care
that ordinary prudent persons would exercise under similar circumstances in like position);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150 (Law. Co-op. 1983) (same).
35. City National Bank, 801 F.2d at 716.
36. Id. at 716-17. In support of the defendant's contention in City National Bank that
the defendant did not violate Rule 10b-13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because the
defendant had completed the purchase of the Post family's in All American Assurance Company
before the tender offer period, the defendant explained that the December 11, 1979 stock
purchase agreement required Great Commonwealth Life Insurance Company to pay five percent
of the purchase price on the closing date, December 12, 1979. Id. A defendant's witness then
testified that the Post family delivered the stock certificates to the defendant on December 12,
1979. Id. at 717. The defendant next noted that the tender offer period did not commence
until the public announcement of the tender offer, December 14, 1979. Id. Accordingly, the
defendant argued that defendant did not violate Rule lOb-13 because the evidence established,
as a matter of law, that the defendant acquired ownership of the Post family stock two days
before the tender offer period. Id.
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the Post family's interest in All American's stock when Great Common-
wealth and Post entered into the stock purchase agreement? The defendant
claimed that the defendant became a beneficial owner of the Post family's
interest in All American Assurance Company's stock on December 11, 1979
under Rule 13d of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.38 The defendant,
therefore, asserted that the Post family and Great Commonwealth Life
Insurance Company executed the pre-tender stock purchase before com-
mencement of the tender offer.3 9 Accordingly, the defendant argued that
the defendant did not violate Rule lOb-13.
4
0
Upon presentation of the evidence, the jury found that Great Com-
monwealth's purchase of the Post family's interest in All American's stock
violated Rule lOb-13 and that Great Commonwealth made the purchase
with the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud the plaintiffs. 41 Addi-
tionally, the jury found that the defendant committed common law fraud
and breached the defendant's fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders
of All American.42 The jury in City National Bank found, however, that
the defendant did not violate rule lOb-5 because any omissions in the tender
offer would not have affected the investment decision of a reasonable
shareholder.4 3 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $5.28 per share plus nine
percent interest from January 4, 1980 until settlement."
The defendant subsequently filed a motion for a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict in the United States District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina.45 The district court denied the defendant's motion. 6 The
37. Id. at 717; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 13d of '34
Act).




42. Id.; see supra note 34 (discussing common law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty).
43. City National Bank, 801 F.2d at 716; see supra note 11 (Rule lOb-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 requires that omission from tender offer would have influenced
investment decision of reasonable shareholder).
44. City Nat'l Bank v. American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 941, 942
(W.D.N.C. 1985). The jury in City National Bank found that at the time of the tender offer,
All American Assurance Company's stock had a value of $10.28 per share. Id. Because the
plaintiffs tendered their minority shares at $5.00 per share, the jury awarded the plaintiffs
$5.28 per share in damages. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 945. In considering the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in City National Bank, the United States District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina required both the plaintiffs and the defendant to file responses with the
district court concerning the jury's award of prejudgment interest to the plaintiffs on the
plaintiffs' federal lOb-13 claim and the state common law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
claims. Id. at 942. The plaintiffs claimed that both federal securities law and state law permitted
a jury to include prejudgment interest in an award. Id. The defendant conceded that a jury
could award prejudgment interest on a Rule 10b-13 claim. Id. The defendant, however,
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defendant subsequently appealed the district court's decision denying the
defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.47 On appeal the defendant
again argued that the evidence did not support the jury's finding that the
defendant's purchase of the Post family's interest in All American's stock
violated Rule lOb-13 of the '34 Act.4 The defendant argued alternatively
that the defendant did not violate Rule 10b-13 because the defendant became
the beneficial owner of the Post family's interest in All American's stock
contested the plaintiffs' assertion that state law allowed a jury to award prejudgment interest
on a state securities law claim. Id.
In examining the award of prejudgment interest on the plaintiffs' Rule 10b-13 claim, the
district court determined that federal common law controls an award of prejudgment interest.
Id. The district court further determined that whether an award of prejudgment interest is
appropriate in a securities fraud case is a question of fairness that lies within a district court's
sound discretion. Id. The district court then explained that a finding of a defendant's personal
wrongdoing can tip the balance of the fundamental fairness of a prejudgment interest award
in favor of a plaintiff. Id. at 943. The district court recognized that the award of prejudgment
interest often occurs in cases that involve breach of fiduciary duty. Id. The district court in
City National Bank noted that the jury found that a relationship of trust and confidence
existed between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Id. The district court further noted that the
jury found that the defendants violated Rule lOb-13 with the intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud the plaintiffs. Id. The City National Bank court explained, therefore, that the court
attributed particular significance to the defendant's wrongdoing because the defendant's wrong-
doing amounted to calculated fraud. Id.
In weighing the factors of fundamental fairness of the prejudgment interest award, the
district court also considered whether the award of prejudgment interest was compensatory in
nature and whether the delay between the act complained of and the date of trial was
substantially the responsibility of the plaintiff. Id. Upon concluding that the prejudgment
interest was compensatory in nature, that the plaintiff was not responsible for the delay
between the act complained of and the date of trial, and that the defendant's wrongdoing
deserved added significance, the district court upheld the jury's award of prejudgment interest
on the Rule 10b-13 claim. Id. at 944; see Muscat v. Norte & Co., 397 U.S. 989, 997
(1970)(defendant's personal wrongdoing is factor to consider in weighing fundamental fairness
of prejudgment interest award); Blau v. Lehmen, 368 U.S. 403, 410 (1962)(in federal securities
cases, court awards interest based on considerations of fairness).
In examining the award of prejudgment interest on the plaintiffs' common law fraud
and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the City National Bank court determined that North
Carolina state law controls an award of prejudgment interest. City National Bank, 608 F.
Supp. at 944. The district court explained that North Carolina law prohibits an award for
prejudgment interest when damages are not liquidated or readily ascertainable. Id. The district
court then determined that under North Carolina law, monetary damages awarded for the
fraudulent sale of stock are not liquidated or readily ascertainable. Id. Accordingly, the district
court in City National Bank reversed the jury's award of prejudgment interest on the plaintiffs'
common law fraud and breach of fiduciary claims. Id.; see Lazenby v. Godwin, 60 N.C. App.
504, 509, 299 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1983)(prohibiting award of prejudgment interest in tort action
in which defendants used fiduciary relationship with plaintiff to fraudulently procure sale of
plaintiff's stock).
47. City Nat'l Bank v. American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 801 F.2d 714, 715 (4th
Cir. 1986).
48. Id. at 716; see supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing defendant's
arguments at trial court level).
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on December 11, 1979 . 4 The defendant also reasserted its argument that
the evidence did not support the jury's finding that the defendant committed
common law fraud and breached the defendant's fiduciary duty to the
plaintiffs.5 0 Additionally, the defendant argued that the jury improperly
included a control premium in the award of damages of $5.28 per share."
In examining the defendant's assertion that the defendant did not violate
Rule lOb-13 because the evidence established that the defendant completed
the purchase of the Post family's interest in All American's shares prior to
the commencement of the tender offer, the Fourth Circuit recognized that
the plaintiffs presented evidence that Great Commonwealth and Post did
not execute the pre-tender stock purchase agreement according to the terms
of agreement and did not execute the agreement prior to the tender offer.1
2
The Fourth Circuit found, therefore, that the district court properly sub-
mitted the issue concerning the execution of the pre-tender purchase agree-
ment to the jury." The Fourth Circuit also explained that from the evidence,
the jury could infer that Great Commonwealth and Post did not execute
the pre-tender stock purchase agreement prior to the tender offer.14 The
Fourth Circuit noted that despite the defendant's witness who testified that
Post delivered the securities to Great Commonwealth on December 12, 1979,
evidence existed that demonstrated that Great Commonwealth did not pay
Post until after December 17, 1979.15 In support of the jury's finding that
the defendant violated Rule lOb-13 with the intent to deceive, defraud, or
manipulate the plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit explained that the relationship
between Post and Shaw conceivably could have induced the plaintiffs into
selling the plaintiffs' minority interest in All American at a price below the
actual value of the plaintiff's interest.16 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the evidence supported the jury's
finding that the defendant violated Rule lOb-13 because the defendant did
not complete the purchase of the Post family's interest in All American's
stock before the commencement of the tender offer.5
7
49. City National Bank, 801 F.2d at 717.
50. Id. at 716; see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing defendant's
arguments at trial court level).
51. City National Bank, 801 F.2d at 718; see Alma Capital Ass'n v. Wagner, 758 F.2d
562, 566 (11th Cir. 1985)(defining control premium). The Alma Capital Association court
defined control premium as the enhanced value of stock on a per share basis due to a
shareholder's controlling position in a corporation, as opposed to a non-controlling position.
Alma Capital Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 566.




56. Id.; see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between
Post family and Shaw).
57. City National Bank, 801 F.2d at 717.
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In addition to considering the defendant's argument that the defendant
did not violate Rule lOb-13 because he had completed the private stock
purchase agreement prior to the tender offer period, the Fourth Circuit
considered the defendant's alternative Rule lOb-13 argument that the defend-
ant did not violate Rule lOb-13 because the he became the beneficial owner
of the Post family's interest in All American's stock when Great Common-
wealth and Post entered into the stock purchase agreement on December
11, 1979. 51 The City National Bank court explained that Rule lOb-13
regulates the purchase of stock and not the claim to beneficial ownership
of the stock.5 9 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the pre-
tender purchase agreement, nonetheless, did not purport to convey the Post
family's interest in All American's stock to Great Commonwealth at the
time the parties entered into the agreementA° The City National Bank court,
therefore, rejected the defendant's claim that the defendant did not violate
Rule lOb-13 because the defendant became the beneficial owner of the Post
family's interest in All American's stock on December 11, 1979.61 Accord-
ingly, the Fourth Circuit held that Rule lOb-13 is applicable to contracts
for the private purchase of stock that are executory at the time of a tender
offer. 62
In addition to considering the defendant's Rule lOb-13 arguments, the
Fourth Circuit considered the defendant's contention that the evidence did
not support the jury's finding that the defendant had committed common
law fraud and had breached the defendant's fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs.63
The defendant argued that an inconsistency existed in finding that the
defendant committed common law fraud and had breached fiduciary duties
but did not violate Rule lOb-5A4 The City National Bank court explained,
however, that a distinction exists between a common law act of commission
of fraud and deceit and a Rule lob-5 omission. 65 Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the district court's holding that the defendant had committed




60. Id. In City National Bank the Fourth Circuit noted that the pre-tender purchase
agreement did not convey beneficial ownership to the defendant, but instead provided for
delivery of the Post family's interest in All American Assurance Company's stock to Great




63. Id. at 718.
64. Id.; see supra notes 11 & 34 and accompanying text (discussing elements of Rule
lOb-5 and common law fraud).
65. City National Bank, 801 F.2d at 718. Compare supra note 11 (violation of Rule
lOb-5 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can be act of omission) with supra note 34 (violation
of common law fraud is act of commission).
66. City National Bank, 801 F.2d at 718.
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After denying the defendant's claims concerning Rule lOb-13 and com-
mon law fraud, the Fourth Circuit considered the defendant's assertion that
the jury's award of $5.28 per share in damages improperly included a
control premium.6 7 In examining the defendant's contention, the City Na-
tional Bank court found that from the evidence, the jury could infer that
the award did not include a control premium.68 The Fourth Circuit noted
that American Commonwealth acquired a controlling block of All American
stock in January, 1979 for $10.28 per share.6 The Fourth Circuit further
noted that Robert Shaw, president of American Commonwealth and All
American and a director of Great Commonwealth, testified that $10.28 per
share for All American's stock was a bargain purchase and that Shaw
would have paid more for All American's stock. 70 The Fourth Circuit also
noted that the plaintiff's expert witness testified that All American's shares
were worth $14.63 per share in December, 1979.71 Accordingly, the City
National Bank court found that the jury's award of $5.28 per share did
not include a control premium.7 2
The Fourth Circuit in City National Bank correctly held that Rule 1Ob-
13 applied to the pre-tender purchase agreements that the parties to the
agreement consummated during the tender offer period.73 Because other
courts have not considered explicitly whether Rule lOb-13 applies to pre-
tender purchase agreements that the parties do not execute fully until the
tender offer period, courts should turn for guidance to SEC pronouncements
concerning Rule lOb-13 and the statutory language of Rule 10b-13. 74 For
example, in a letter from the SEC to Radiation Dynamics, Inc. (RDI letter),
the SEC considered whether Rule lOb-13 applied to an executory pre-tender
stock purchase agreement that the parties to the agreement were to execute
after the completion of a tender offer.75 In the RDI letter, Radiation
67. Id.; see supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing jury's award of damages);
supra note 51 and accompanying text (defining control premium).





73. See infra notes 54-129 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Rule lOb-13
applies to pre-tender stock purchase agreements that the parties consummate during the tender
offer period).
74. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 30, 1982)(discussing
application of Rule lOb-13 to executory pre-tender purchase agreement in connection with
tender offer and merger proposal); Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug.
20, 1982)(same); Radiation Dynamics, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 4, 1974)(discussing
application of Rule lOb-13 to pre-tender purchase agreement that the parties had not consum-
mated fully at commencement of tender offer); see also infra notes 75-107 and accompanying
text (discussing Securities Exchange Commission pronouncements concerning Rule 10b-13);
infra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Rule lOb-13).
75. Radiation Dynamics, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 4, 1974)(discussing application
of Rule lOb-13 to executory pre-tender purchase agreement in connection with tender offer).
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Dynamics, Incorporated (RDI) represented that Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company (Firestone) owned 66% of the common stock of RDI.7 6 Firestone
agreed to sell the 66% interest in RDI to Oppenheimer & Company
(Oppenheimer). 7 Within five days of the execution of the agreement between
Firestone and Oppenheimer, RDI intended to make a tender offer for the
remaining outstanding shares of RDI's common stock. 8 The tender offer
price was to be the same as the price that Oppenheimer paid for Firestone's
interest in RDI's common stock.79 Oppenheimer's actual purchase of Fire-
stone's interest in RDI's stock, however, would not occur until after the
tender offer. 0 In addition, Firestone and Oppenheimer did not condition
the purchase agreement on the success of RDI's tender offer." RDI also
intended to give RDI's shareholders an opportunity to withdraw previously
tendered shares if Oppenheimer failed to purchase Firestone's interest in
RDI's stock. 82 Furthermore, RDI intended to disclose fully the entire trans-
action to RDI's shareholders in the public tender offer.8 3 In examining the
representations in the RDI letter, the SEC concluded that it would not take
76. Id. In the no-action letter from the Securities Exchange Commission to Radiation
Dynamics, Inc.(RDI), RDI represented that RDI registered its common stock under § 12(g) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and traded the common stock over-the-counter. Id.
77. Id. In the no-action letter from the Securities Exchange Commission to Radiation
Dynamics, Inc.(RDI), RDI represented that Oppenheimer & Co. (Oppenheimer) agreed to
purchase Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.'s (Firestone) interest in RDI for $4,000,000. Id. The
purchase price represented 1,304,250 shares of Firestone's interest in RDI's stock at approxi-
mately $3.07 per share. Id.
78. Id. In the no-action letter from the Securities Exchange Commission to Radiation
Dynamics, Inc. (RDI), RDI intended to redeem all of RDI's outstanding common stock except
the RDI common stock that Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (Firestone) and the officers
and directors of RDI owned. Id. The total amount of RDI's common stock that Firestone
and the directors of RDI did not own was 636,283 shares. Id. RDI and Firestone entered into
a pre-tender agreement, however, that required Firestone to sell to RDI any difference between
the actual number of shares tendered and 636,283 shares at $3.07 per share. Id. RDI and
Firestone agreed that any sale from Firestone to RDI would not occur until after the tender
offer period. Id. Accordingly, any sale from Firestone to RDI would reduce the number of
shares that Firestone agreed to sell to Oppenheimer & Company by an amount equal to the
number of shares that Firestone sold to RDI. Id. RDI and Firestone also agreed that if
Firestone and Oppenheimer cancelled the agreement for Oppenheimer to purchase Firestone's
interest in RDI's stock, Firestone would not have to sell Firestone's interest in RDI's stock to
RDI. Id.
79. Id. In the letter from the Securities Exchange Commission to Radiation Dynamics,
Inc., RDI offered to pay $3.07 for each share of RDI stock tendered by outstanding
shareholders of RDI other than Firestone Tire and Rubber Company and the officers and
directors of RDI. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. In the letter from the Securities Exchange Commission to Radiation Dynamics,
Inc., Oppenheimer & Co.'s purchase of Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.'s interest in RDI's
common stock was to occur whether RDI proceeded with the tender offer or cancelled the





action against RDI for violating Rule lOb-13 in the transaction described
in the letter 
4
The SEC correctly did not take action against RDI for violating Rule
lOb-13 because the transaction did not deceive the shareholders of RDI
concerning the true nature of the transaction. s5 The transaction described
in the RDI letter did not deceive RDI's shareholders because the tender
offer disclosed fully the pre-tender stock purchase agreement and Firestone
and Oppenheimer did not execute the agreement until after the tender offer
period.86 Additionally, the tender offer price equaled the stock purchase
agreement price and the tender offer gave tendering shareholders an op-
portunity to withdraw previously tendered shares if Firestone and Oppen-
heimer did not execute the agreement. 87 Accordingly, the SEC found that
a tender offeror can enter an executory pre-tender stock purchase agreement
without violating Rule lOb-13 when the parties do not consummate the
agreement during the tender offer period and the agreement does not deceive
shareholders. 8
A letter from the SEC to R.J. Reynolds Industries, Incorporated (R.J.
Reynolds letter) also demonstrates that Rule lOb-13 should not apply to pre-
tender stock purchase agreements when the agreements do not deceive
shareholders.89 In the R.J. Reynolds letter, the SEC considered whether
Rule lOb-13 applied to an executory pre-tender stock purchase agreement
that the parties to the agreement were to execute after the completion of a
84. Id. The Securities Exchange Commission concluded that the transactions in the
letter from the SEC to Radiation Dynamics, Inc. (RDI) would not violate Rule lOb-13 only
if RDI, Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., and Oppenheimer & Co. acted in accordance with
the representations of RDI in the letter. Id.
85. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (transaction described in letter from
Securities Exchange Commission to Radiation Dynamics, Inc. (RDI) did not deceive RDI's
shareholders).
86. See Wellborn, supra note 7, at 661 (purchases of target company's stock during
tender offer period is deceiving whether or not purchase is made with intent to influence
shareholder behavior). Compare Radiation Dynamics, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 4,
1974)(manipulation of shareholders by pre-tender stock purchase agreement did not exist
because parties fully disclosed agreement and parties did not execute agreement during tender
offer period) with City Nat'l Bank v. American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 801 F.2d 714,
716-17 (4th Cir. 1986)(although parties disclosed fully pre-tender stock purchase agreement,
manipulation of target company's shareholder existed because agreement executed during tender
offer period).
87. See Radiation Dynamics, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 4, 1974)(shareholder
manipulation prevented because tender offer price equaled stock purchase agreement price).
But cf. Wellborn, supra note 7, at 660 (market activity in security by person engaged in
purchase of security can induce others persons to purchase security).
88. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text (discussing Securities Exchange
Commission finding concerning application of Rule 10b-13 to pre-tender purchase agreement
in letter from SEC to Radiation Dynamics, Inc.).
89. See R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 30, 1983)(permitting
non-manipulative pre-tender stock purchase agreement).
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tender offer.90 In the R.J. Reynolds letter, R.J. Reynolds Industries, Incor-
porated (R.J. Reynolds) represented that R.J. Reynolds and Heublein,
Incorporated (Heublein) agreed that Heublein would merge into a wholly-
owned subsidiary of R.J. Reynolds (Subsidiary).9' Additionally, R.J. Rey-
nolds and Heublein also agreed that R.J. Reynolds would purchase privately
shares of Heublein's outstanding common stock for $63 per share.92 Fur-
thermore, the Subsidiary was to make a cash tender offer to purchase up
to 51% of Heublein's common stock for $63 per share.93 R.J. Reynolds
and Heublein, however, conditioned R.J. Reynolds' private purchase of
Heublein's outstanding common stock on the completion of the tender
offer.94
In examining the representations in the R.J. Reynolds letter, the SEC
correctly concluded that the SEC should not take action against R.J.
Reynolds for violating Rule lOb-13 in the transaction described in the
letter. 95 The SEC explained that it would not take action against R.J.
Reynolds if R.J. Reynolds' private purchase of Heublein's outstanding
common stock did not occur either during the tender offer or did not occur
less than ten days after the tender offer period. 96 Additionally, the pre-
tender stock purchase agreement price equaled the tender offer price.9 7 The
SEC, therefore, found that Rule lOb-13 would not apply to an executory
pre-tender stock purchase agreement that the parties to the agreement were
to execute after the completion of a tender offer. 98 Like the RDI letter, the
90. Id.
91. Id. In the letter from the Securities Exchange Commission to R.J. Reynolds
Industries, Inc. (R.J. Reynolds), R.J. Reynolds and Heublein, Inc. (Heublein) conditioned the
merger upon approval of the merger by the shareholders of both R.J. Reynolds and Heublein.
Id. Upon approval of the merger by the shareholders of both entities, each share of Heublein
common stock was to be converted into the number of shares of R.J. Reynolds Industries
common stock divided by 31.83 and one share of R.J. Reynolds Industries authorized but
unissued series B cumulative preferred stock valued at $25 per share. Id.
92. Id. In the letter from the Securities Exchange Commission to R.J. Reynolds
Industries, Inc., R.J. Reynolds represented that in connection with the merger between the
wholly-owned subsidiary of R.J. Reynolds and Heublein, Inc., R.J. Reynolds agreed to purchase
18.4% of Heublein's outstanding common stock as of June 30, 1982. Id.
93. Id. In the letter from the Securities Exchange Commission to R.J. Reynolds Industries
Inc., R.J. Reynolds asserted that its wholly-owned subsidiary was to complete the cash tender





97. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 30, 1982); see infra notes
126-30 and accompanying text (although pre-tender stock purchase agreement price equals
tender offer price, manipulation may exist).
98. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 30, 1982). In addition to
requiring R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. to execute the pre-tender stock purchase agreement
after the tender offer and requiring the tender offer price to equal the agreement price, the
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R.J. Reynolds letter expresses the notion that the prevention of shareholder
manipulation is the primary purpose of Rule 10b-13. 99
In addition to SEC no-action letters, the statutory language of Rule
lOb-13 aids in determining whether parties to a pre-tender stock purchase
agreement may execute the agreement after the commencement of the tender
offer.100 The express language of Rule lOb-13 prohibits a person making a
tender offer from purchasing or arranging to purchase any security unless
the purchase is pursuant to the tender offer during the tender offer period.101
The SEC has commented on arrangements, made during the tender offer
period, to purchase shares of a target company's stock after the expiration
of the tender offer period.0 2 In the initial release adopting Rule lOb-13, the
SEC explained that Rule lOb-13 prohibits agreements between parties, which
the parties make during the tender offer period, to purchase shares of a
target company's stock after the tender offer period. 03 Although the SEC
has not issued a release that specifically comments on pre-tender arrange-
ments to purchase shares of a target company's stock that the parties make
before and execute during the tender offer period, Rule lOb-13 likewise
should prohibit these pre-tender arrangements, even when full disclosure of
the arrangements is present.104 The SEC recognized that arrangements to
purchase shares of a target company's stock that the parties consummate
Securities Exchange Commission specifically expressed no position concerning the adequacy of
disclosure that R.J. Reynolds would need to make in the tender offer. Id. The SEC did not
express a position concerning the adequacy of disclosure because R.J. Reynolds never described
the disclosure of the pre-tender stock purchase agreement. Id.; see infra notes 126-30 and
accompanying text (although tender offer discloses pre-tender stock purchase agreement,
shareholder manipulation may exist).
99. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text (discussing letter form Securities
Exchange Commission to Radiation Dynamics, Inc.); supra note 124 and accompanying text
(prevention of shareholder manipulation is primary purpose of Rule 10b-13).
100. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text (discussing whether pre-tender stock
purchase agreement that parties to agreement do not consummate prior to tender offer violates
express language of Rule 10b-13).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-13(a) (1986); see supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing
provisions of Rule IOb-13).
102. See Exchange Act Release No. 8712, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) § 77,745 at 83,708 (Oct. 8, 1969)(discussing Rule lOb-13 provision concerning arrange-
ments for private purchases of stock of target company).
103. Id. In the release adopting Rule 10b-13, the Securities Exchange Commission
explained Rule 10b-13 prohibits stock purchase agreements made during the tender offer period
that the parties do not execute until after the tender offer period, whether or not the parties
have agreed on the terms of the purchase. Id. Additionally, parties cannot agree during the
tender offer period to negotiate a stock purchase agreement after the tender offer period. Id.
104. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13(a) (1986)(discussing provisions of Rule lOb-13); see also
supra notes 75-99 and accompanying text (discussing Securities Exchange Commission position
in no-action letters prohibiting parties to pre-tender agreement to purchase target company's
stock from executing agreement during tender offer period); infra notes 106-07 and accom-
panying text (Rule lOb-13 should prohibit pre-tender agreements to purchase target company's
stock that parties to agreement execute during tender offer period);
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during a tender offer period artificially can increase or decrease demand
for the stock. 05 The artificial shift in demand for a target company's stock
can influence shareholder behavior because tender offerors can mislead
shareholders into tendering or refraining from tendering shares of the target
company's stock depending on the demand for the stock.'06 Accordingly,
Rule lOb-13 should prohibit pre-tender arrangements to purchase a target
company's stock that the parties fully execute during a tender offer because
the arrangements can manipulate shareholder behavior. 0 7
In addition to the express statutory language of Rule lOb-13 concerning
arrangements to purchase, the interpretation of the statutory language
concerning purchase is essential to the proper interpretation of Rule lOb-
13.108 The SEC designed Rule lOb-13 to prohibit pre-tender stock purchase
agreements to purchase shares of a target company's stock that the parties
to the agreements consummate during the tender offer period to prevent
manipulation of shareholder behavior.2 9 Parties to pre-tender stock purchase
agreements, however, should not be able to circumvent the purpose of Rule
lOb-13 by claiming that the purchase of the stock is complete upon transfer
of the beneficial ownership of the stock prior to the tender offer period." 0
A purchase of a security includes contracts to purchase or to acquire for
value a security or interest in a security."' A beneficial owner of a security
includes any person who has voting or investment power over the security
or the right to acquire voting or investment power over a security." 2 Section
105. See Exchange Act Release No. 8712, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) § 77,745 at 83,708 (Oct. 8, 1969)(parties to private stock purchase agreement can
manipulate demand for target company's stock by consummating agreement during tender
offer period).
106. See Wellborn, supra note 7, at 661 (private stock purchases that occur during tender
offer period may induce shareholders to tender shares of target company stock). One com-
mentator notes that private stock purchases that occur during a tender offer period can mislead
shareholders into believing that demand for the target company's shares has shifted and,
therefore may influence shareholder behavior. Id.
107. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (discussing application of Rule lob-
13 to pre-tender stock purchase agreements).
108. See infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of "purchase"
under Rule 10b-13).
109. See Exchange Act Release No. 8595, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) § 77,706 at 83,616-18 (May 5, 1969)(SEC promulgated Rule 10b-13 to prevent share-
holder manipulation).
110. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text (discussing whether Rule lOb-13
applies to persons acquiring beneficial ownership in pre-tender stock purchase agreement).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(14) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(defining purchase under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); see Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc. 290 F.Supp. 715, 719
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)(discussing interpretation of purchase under Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
The term purchase includes every contract to buy, purchase or otherwise acquire a security.
Commerce Reporting Co., 290 F.Supp. at 719.
112. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a),(d) (1986)(defining beneficial ownership); see also
Welman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 365-66 (2d Cir. 1982)(beneficial ownership includes any
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13(d) of the '34 Act requires that any person who becomes the beneficial
owner of greater than five percent of one class of a security must file with
the SEC a statement concerning the acquisition of the security." '3 The
Congress employed the concept of beneficial ownership under Sections 13(d)
and 13(g) to provide investors in securities with full disclosure of the identity
of any person or group of persons amassing large blocks of stock.14 The
information concerning large accumulations of a security alerts shareholders
to potential changes in corporate control and thus provides shareholders
with a means to value the security." ' The SEC, however, interpreted
Congress' intent as limiting the application of beneficial ownership to
Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the '34 Act." 6 Congress did not intend that
investors use Section 13(d) as a weapon to obtain stock at artificially
depressed prices . 7 Investors potentially would be able to obtain stock at
person with voting power or right to acquire voting power over a security); K-N Energy, Inc.
v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F. Supp. 756, 762 (D. Colo. 1983)(beneficial owner includes persons
with voting power or investment power over security); supra notes 37-40 and accompanying
text (defendant in City National Bank argued that defendant did not violate Rule lOb-13
because defendant became beneficial owner under Rule 13d before commencement of tender
offer).
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-
1(a), 240.13d-101 (1986)(requiring persons to file information statement with Securities Ex-
change Commission upon acquiring five percent or more of a company's stock).
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also H. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (§ 13(d) of '34 Act provides investors with information concerning
large stock accumulations for valuation purposes), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CoNrG. & AD.
NEws 2811, 2818; Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 1982)(purpose of § 13(d)
is to provide investors in securities with adequate information concerning persons acquiring
large amounts of stock); K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F. Supp. 756, 762 (D.
Colo. 1983)(§ 13(d) provides investors with information for valuation purposes); 17 C.F.R. §§
240.13d (Rule 13d provides for disclosure of information to investors concerning person or
group of persons acquiring more than five percent of outstanding shares of company).
115. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 365 (2d Cir. 1982X§ 13d of '34 Act
informs shareholders of potential changes in corporate control, permitting shareholders to act
on informed basis); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971)(§ 13d provides
information that allows investors to value security); K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co.,
607 F. Supp. 756, 762 (D. Colo. 1983)(same).
116. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1986)(SEC interpreted Congressional intent to limit
application of beneficial ownership to § 13d of '34 Act); see Exchange Act Release No. 15,348,
[1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) § 91,838 at 92,765 (Nov. 22,
1978)(explaining that § 13d does not concern manipulation but provides investors information
concerning rapid accumulations of stock).
117. See K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F. Supp, 756, 762 (D. Colo.
1983)(§ 13(d) of '34 Act does not provide investors with method to obtain stock). In K-N
Energy, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado explained that Congress
designed § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide investors with the
information necessary to value securities. ld. The district court further explained that in
addition to the notion that § 13(d) does not permit investors to obtain stock at artificially
depressed prices, § 13(d) does not permit corporate management to use § 13(d) to avoid
takeover attempts. Id.; see infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text (describing method by
which investors could avoid application of Section lOb-13 if term purchase in Section 1Ob-13
included investors with beneficial ownership claim to target company stock).
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artificially depressed prices because investors could create a manipulative
pre-tender stock purchase agreement that conveys beneficial ownership of a
target company's stock to the purchaser at the time of the agreement."'
The parties to the agreement, however, would not execute the agreement
until the tender offer period, thus misleading shareholders about the demand
for and value of the stock. " 9 Consequently, allowing purchases to encompass
beneficial ownership of a target company's stock under Rule lOb-13 would
permit, to the detriment of shareholders, the manipulation of a tender offer
that Rule lOb-13 attempts to prohibit. 2 0 To allow purchases to include
beneficial ownership under Rule 10b-13, therefore, would be inconsistent
with the purposes of the '33 and '34 Acts.12 1 Congress enacted the '33 and
'34 Acts and corresponding rules to protect investors from abuses in the
securities market, not to enhance the potential for abuses in the securities
market through manipulation of the sections under the '33 and '34 Acts.'1
In addition to the interpretation of the express statutory language of
Rule 10b-13 concerning arrangements to purchase and purchases, the pur-
pose underlying the promulgation of Rule lOb-13 provides insight concerning
purchases outside the terms of the formal tender offer. 2 3 The purpose of
preventing purchases of or arrangements to purchase stock that are not
pursuant to a tender offer is to safeguard the interests of persons who have
tendered stock under the terms of the tender offer. 2 4 More specifically,
various courts have stated that the SEC designed Rule lOb-13 to prevent
outside purchases of stock at a price different than the price stated in the
tender offer.' 21 Rule lOb-13, however, should also apply to cases when the
118. See City Nat'l Bank v. American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 801 F.2d 714, 717
(4th Cir. 1986)(applying beneficial ownership to Rule lOb-13 makes Rule lOb-13 inapplicable
because parties would have executed transaction before commencement of tender offer period).
119. Id.; see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding
in City National Bank concerning application of beneficial ownership to Rule lOb-13).
120. See infra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Rule lOb-13 of
'34 Act).
121. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of Securities Act
of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 100-22 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of language
of Rule 10b-13 concerning purchases outside terms of tender offer); see also infra note 124
and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Rule 10b-13).
124. See Exchange Act Release No. 8595, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'.
(CCH) § 77,706 at 83,616-18 (May 5, 1969)(Rule lOb-13 protects shareholders by preventing
tender offerors from offering to purchase stock from shareholders at various prices).
125. See Pryor v. United States Steel Corp., 591 F. Supp. 942, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(Rule
10b-13 prevents tender offerors from offering to purchase stock from shareholders at a price
different from purchase outside tender offer); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 833
(S.D.N.Y. 1979)(Rule 10b-13 prevents tender offeror from making private purchases of stock
at price different from tender offer stock price); Heine v. Signal Cos., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) § 95,898 at 91,319 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(same). In Wellman v.
Dickinson the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered
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price per share of a target company's stock in a tender offer is the same
as the price per share of a target company's stock in purchases outside the
tender offer. 2 6 Although the price per share of a target company's stock
in a tender offer equals the price per share of a target company's stock in
purchases outside the tender offer, manipulation, nonetheless, may be
present. 27 When the tender offer price equals the private stock purchase
agreement price, the identical prices may mislead shareholders because the
price of the tender offer actually may be less than the true value of the
target company's stock.' 2s Accordingly, Rule lOb-13 should apply to situa-
tions when the tender offer price and the private stock purchase agreement
prices are equal to prevent the manipulation of a target company's share-
holders.' 29
In City National Bank v. American Commonwealth Financial Corp.,
the Fourth Circuit held that Rule lOb-13 applied to pre-tender stock purchase
agreements that the parties to the agreement did not execute until the tender
offer period. 30 The City National Bank court's decision protects a target
company's shareholders from manipulation by applying Rule lOb-13 to pre-
tender stock purchase agreements when the parties to the agreement con-
summate the agreement during the tender offer period."' The purpose of
whether the defendant violated Rule IOb-13. Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 791-93. In Wellman,
a corporation, purchased from the defendant, pursuant to a tender offer, shares of stock on
terms different from terms applicable to other tender offerees. Id. at 833. In examining the
plaintiff's 1Ob-13 claim, the district court explained that Rule 10b-13 protects shareholders
who have tendered shares under a tender offer by prohibiting purchases outside the tender
offer that have terms different from the terms of the tender offer. Id. The district court
further explained that the payment to the defendant under the tender offer provided the
defendant with a tax benefit that other tender offerees did not receive. Id. at 834. Accordingly,
because the terms of the tender offer differed and thus provided the defendant with a benefit
that other tender offerees did not receive, the district court found that the defendant violated
Rule 10b-13. Id.
126. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (discussing application of Rule lOb-
13 to situations when price of shares in tender offer is same as price of shares in privately
negotiated sales); see also supra notes 23, 26 and accompanying text (in City National Bank,
prices of shares in tender offer was same as price of shares in privately negotiated pre-tender
stock purchase agreement).
127. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (manipulation of shareholders may
exist in tender offer when tender offer price per share is same as privately negotiated price
per share).
128. See Exchange Act Release No. 8712, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) § 77,745 at 83,708 (Oct. 8, 1969)(private stock purchase agreements that parties execute
during tender offer period can manipulate target company's shareholders irrespective of price
per share in tender offer and price per share in agreement).
129. See supra notes - and accompanying text (Rule lOb-13 applies when tender offer
price for stock is same as privately negotiated price for stock).
130. City Nat'l Bank v. American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 801 F.2d 714, 718 (4th
Cir. 1986); see supra notes 47-72 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding
in City National Bank).
131. See supra notes 73-129 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's holding in City
National Bank prevents shareholder manipulation).
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Rule lOb-13, which is to prevent shareholder manipulation, mandates that
parties should not be able to execute pre-tender stock purchase agreements
during a tender offer period due to potential stockholder manipulation.
3 2
Even when a tender offer discloses a pre-tender stock purchase agreement,
courts should not allow the parties to the agreement to execute the agreement
during the tender offer period because the potential for shareholder manip-
ulation, nonetheless, exists.'33 The mere satisfaction of the disclosure re-
quirements of the Williams Act should not serve to validate pre-tender stock
purchase agreements that permit tender offerors to mislead shareholders
regarding the value of a security solely due to the timing of the agreement's
execution. 3 4 Courts, therefore, should examine the substantive nature of
pre-tender stock purchase agreements and apply Rule lOb-13 to pre-tender
purchase agreement situations when the potential for shareholder manipu-
lation exists. 5
STEPHEN H. THOMAS
132. See supra notes 100-29 and accompanying text (pre-tender stock purchase agreements
that parties execute during tender offer period potentially can manipulate shareholders).
133. See supra notes 75-129 and accompanying text (even when tender offer discloses
pre-tender stock purchase agreement, shareholder manipulation potentially can occur).
134. See Wellborn, supra note 7, at 663 (noting that Rule lOb-13 should prevent, during
tender offer period, arbitrageurs' private purchases in open market that cause market price
distortions that are impervious to disclosure requirements).
135. See supra notes 75-134 and accompanying text (Rule lOb-13 applies to pre-tender
stock purchase agreements when parties execute agreement during tender offer period).
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